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Abstrat. The eld of protool analysis is one area in whih CSP has
proven partiularly suessful, and several tehniques have been proposed
that use CSP to reason about seurity properties suh as ondentiality
and authentiation. In this paper we desribe one suh approah, based
on theorem-proving, that uses the idea of a rank funtion to establish
the orretness of protools. This desription is motivated by the onsid-
eration of a simple, but awed, authentiation protool. We show how a
rank funtion analysis an be used to loate this aw and prove that a
modied version of the protool is orret.
1 Introdution
In their seminal paper [NS78℄, Needham and Shroeder proposed a way of us-
ing ryptographi mehanisms, suh as publi-key and shared-key enryption,
in order to establish authentiation guarantees aross networks. Suh meha-
nisms typially involve an exhange of messages between partiipants, and are
known as authentiation protools. Partiipants arry out ryptographi opera-
tions partiular to them (suh as enrypting with a spei seret key) whih are
intended to provide guarantees as to their identity. Suh protools are designed
to provide authentiation even in inseure environments, where other parties an
potentially interfere with messages over the network in various ways. For exam-
ple, messages an be overheard, opied, bloked, replayed, diverted, dupliated,
and spoofed.
As a motivating and running example, we will onsider the following exhange
of messages, whih appears as a simple (awed) authentiation protool in the
Handbook of Applied Cryptography [MVV96℄:
A! B : n
A
B ! A : fn
A
;n
B
g
K
AB
A! B : n
B
The aim of this protool is for eah of the partiipants to authentiate themselves
to the other. In other words, eah partiipant should know, by the end of the
protool, the identity of the other partiipant.
This protool involves two partiipants, A and B , who share a symmetri
ryptographi key K
AB
(whih an also be written K
BA
) whih is used by eah
of A and B to enrypt and derypt messages to and from the other. The protool
relies on the assumption that no party other than A or B knows this key. The
protool begins withA, ating as initiator, who invents a new random number (or
none), n
A
, and transmits it to B . This none is sent unenrypted, so any other
agent ould potentially eavesdrop and learn its value, or spoof some arbitrary
none n
I
to B as if it ame from A. (As a result, B 's reeipt of the none does
not arry any assurane that it originated from A.)
On reeipt of the none n
A
, B , as responder, performs a ryptographi op-
eration that no other party an perform: by enrypting the none with K
AB
.
This message is then sent to A, who derypts it using K
AB
. If this deryption
ontains the none n
A
then this provides a guarantee that n
A
must have been
reeived and enrypted by B , sine B is the only other party that knows K
AB
.
This results in the authentiation of B to A: A knows that she has been ommu-
niating with B , and not some maliious party pretending to be B . In order to
ahieve authentiation in the other diretion (A to B), B also inludes a freshly
generated none n
B
in the enryption of the seond message. A is able to de-
rypt this none and send it bak, unenrypted, to B . On reeipt of n
B
, B has
an assurane that it was A who reeived and returned the none, and hene was
the other party involved in the protool run.
The assuranes are obtained by virtue of the fat thatK
AB
is known only to A
and B , and hene evidene of its use provides evidene that A or B were involved
in arrying out the enryption or deryption. Indeed, if A and B are only ever
involved in one protool run, then the protool does provide the authentiation
required of it: A annot reah the end of the run unless B is involved; and B
annot reah the end of the run unless A is involved.
However, agents an generally be involved in multiple protool runs, possibly
simultaneously, potentially with a variety of other partiipants, and in eah ase
may assume the role of either initiator or responder (or, indeed, both). Under
suh irumstanes, the protool is suseptible to an attak: an exhange of
messages after whih one agent has reahed a state where authentiation appears
to have been established, and yet where the party supposedly authentiated has
not in fat been involved.
The attak (also given in [MVV96℄) involves two runs, where A assumes the
role of initiator in one run and responder in the other. In both runs A intends
B to be the other party, but in fat the messages are being proessed by some
other agent E (B), who A onsiders to be B . The runs, labelled  and , are
interspersed as follows:
 : A! E (B) : n
A
 : E (B)! A : n
A
 : A! E (B) : fn
A
;n
0
A
g
K
AB
 : E (B)! A : fn
A
;n
A
g
K
AB
 : A! E (B) : n
A
The steps of the attak are as follows:
1. A initiates a run using none n
A
, apparently with B ; but the none is inter-
epted by E (B).
2. E (B) initiates a separate run with A (who thus takes the role of responder),
apparently with B , using the same none n
A
.
3. On reeipt of the none n
A
, A invents a responder's none n
0
A
and then
returns it, together with n
A
, enrypted under K
AB
.
4. E (B) interepts this message and sends bak exatly the same message to A
as the response to the original none hallenge n
A
of the rst run. A aepts
the none n
0
A
as the none n
B
provided by B .
5. A responds with the none n
A
just reeived.
After this exhange of messages, A has reahed the end of the protool run,
apparently with B , and hene the protool is intended to provide an assurane
that B was indeed the other partiipant. However, B has not been involved at
all. Hene the protool does not provide the assuranes required of it.
Having identied the attak, it is possible to suggest orretions whih will
prevent it. In this example the attak was possible beause the seond message
is symmetri in terms of initiator and responder, and ontains no information
about whih partiipant reated it. This allowed a situation in whihA generated
suh a message and was later persuaded to aept it as if it ame from the other
party. Introduing the name of the partiipant who enrypted the message would
prevent the attak above. This results in the revised protool:
A! B : n
A
B ! A : fB ;n
A
;n
B
g
K
AB
A! B : n
B
However, an we be ondent that no other attaks are possible on the orreted
protool?
In order to obtain suh ondene, it is neessary rst to larify several issues
around the protool:
{ What kind of environment is the protool designed for? In other words, what
are the kinds of attaks that the protool is designed to be resistant to? For
example, on a broadast network an attaker may be able to overhear and
spoof messages, but be unable to blok them.
{ What level of authentiation is the protool designed to provide? For exam-
ple, is it simply intended to establish that the authentiated agent is present
(e.g. that a server is up), or that the authentiated agent knows who he is
ommuniating with.
{ Are the other partiipants assumed to be honest (i.e. attaks an only orig-
inate from outside the olletion of protool partiipants) or an they be
dishonest?
{ Can partiipants run arbitrarily many onurrent protool sessions, or are
there restritions?
This kind of information should be inluded with any protool desription:
the orretness of a protool onsists not only in the sequene of messages it
desribes, but also the environment it is designed for.
There have been a variety of approahes proposed for analysing and verifying
seurity protools [Mea92,Mil95,THG99,Low98,Pau98,CDL
+
99b,AG98,DFG00℄.
Suh approahes do indeed inorporate suh information into the models that
they desribe and analyse.
This paper is onerned with the appliation of CSP [Hoa85,Ros97,Sh99℄ to
the veriation of seurity protools, and in partiular with the rank funtion
approah. There has already been signiant experiene of the appliation of
CSP to ommuniations protools, and that experiene provides a framework
for the appliation of CSP to authentiation protools. Broadly speaking, there
are three omponents of the approah:
{ The requirements on the protool are expressed either as a CSP proess (to
be rened by the implementation), or as sat speiations on the observable
behaviours of the overall system: traes, failures, divergenes. Suh spei-
ations desribe the appropriate behaviour, and provide a basis for judging
whether protools exhibit orret behaviour or not.
{ A protool, although initially desribed in terms of message exhanges, is
aptured in CSP in terms of the behaviour of eah partiipating agent, lead-
ing to an agent-oriented rather than amessage-oriented viewpoint. Eah par-
tiipant in the protool is desribed as a CSP proess. This shift in viewpoint,
away from message transmission and reeption, and towards the individual
agents onsidered in terms of their interations with the rest of the system, is
a key feature in the suess of the approah when applied to authentiation
protools, sine it naturally fouses on where attaks might ome from and
hene how they should be prevented.
{ Finally, the environment is also desribed as a CSP proess. In ommuni-
ations protools, this is generally an unreliable medium whih might lose,
reorder, or dupliate messages. The partiular behaviour aptured within
the medium is preisely that behaviour that the protool has been designed
to overome. For example, the traditional alternating bit protool (see e.g.
[Sh99℄) is designed to provide reliable ommuniation over a medium whih
an lose messages, and so the analysis of the protool inludes a CSP desrip-
tion of exatly suh a medium (whih non-deterministially either reliably
ommuniates a message or else loses it). In the ase of seurity protools,
we need to inlude the apabilities of possible attakers.
When all three omponents are in plae: speiation, environment, and protool
desription, then the mature tools and tehniques that CSP has to oer an
be brought to bear on partiular protools, and whether or not they meet a
partiular speiation.
This paper assumes a knowledge of CSP and, in partiular, the notations of
[Sh99℄.
The next setion elaborates a theory for verifying authentiation protools
based on this approah.
2 Verifying authentiation protools in CSP
Any authentiation protool is intended to run over a network whih an be
subjet to partiular kinds of attak. We take the approah of onsidering an
attaker (synonymous terms inlude `intruder', `enemy', `spy', and `penetrator')
in terms of apabilities, suh as being able to interept messages on the network,
reate new messages for passing on the network, redireting messages, and so
on. We will assume a single attaker, though in fat the attaker we will desribe
has the ability to behave as a olletion of attakers.
2.1 The attaker
Sine the aim is to prove that protools are orret, we take a pessimisti point
of view and assume an attaker with maximal apabilities. In the worst ase, the
attaker has omplete ontrol over all the messages in the network. If a protool is
seure even in suh an environment, then it will be seure in any weaker, perhaps
more realisti, environment. The only apabilities the attaker should not have
are the ability to enrypt or derypt messages without the appropriate keys. As
a onsequene, we assume there is enough redundany in the ryptosystem so
that eah iphertext an be produed in exatly one way. This restrition has
beome known as the perfet enryption assumption [PQ00℄.
We use the Dolev-Yao model, rst proposed in [DY83℄, in whih the attaker
has omplete ontrol of the network and, to all intents and purposes, replaes
the network. Thus, messages that are sent are automatially interepted and
held by the attaker. Messages that are reeived from the network must have
ome from the attaker. This simple model allows for the kinds of attaker be-
haviour desribed earlier. It allows for messages to be delivered normally, sine
one ation the attaker an take is to deliver messages to the intended reipi-
ent unaltered. However, it also allows for messages to be misdireted, bloked,
spoofed, reordered, and dupliated. Furthermore, the attaker an himself be in
possession of some agent identities (names and assoiated ryptographi keys)
and so appear to other agents on the network as a potential ommuniation
partner. In this way,
dishonest agents are enapsulated within the model. Any message that an
be generated by the attaker, from what he has already observed and what he
originally knows, an potentially be delivered to any other agent on the network,
as if it ame from any other agent.
The details of the CSP desription of the attaker model will reet the kind
of environment the protool is designed for. For example, if the protool is in-
tended to operate between two known honest partiipants, then the attaker
might not itself ontrol any agent identities. Furthermore, the preise rypto-
graphi apabilities of the attaker will also be inorporated into the model, and
this might be protool-spei.
The overall network onsists of a number of users onneted to the ommu-
niations medium, whih is under the ontrol of the attaker. The users will be
modelled as CSP proesses USER
i
, where i is the agent's name. We will use a
Pairing
S ` m
1
S ` m
2
S ` m
1
m
2
Unpairing
S ` m
1
m
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Fig. 1. Attaker inferene rules
hannel trans :i for agent i to transmit messages intended for other users onto
the network. An event trans :i :j :m will orrespond to agent i sending messagem,
intended for agent j . We will use a hannel re:j for agent j to reeive messages
from the network. An event re:j :i :m orresponds to agent j reeiving message
m from the network, apparently from i . All message exhanges between protool
partiipants will use hannels and events of this form.
We also need to dene the kind of messages that an be passed around the
network. This will depend on the protool under analysis, sine dierent pro-
tools use dierent message onstrutions. For the example protool introdued
earlier, we will have three pairwise disjoint sets, USER, NONCE , KEY , whih
give the agent identities, nones, and keys respetively. Furthermore, for eah
pair of distint users i and j , there will be a shared key k
ij
= k
ji
suh that
dierent pairs of agents have dierent shared keys. We will use the following
spae of messages, dened using BNF as the set MESSAGE :
M
1
;M
2
::= messages
I (2 USER) agent identities
N (2 NONCE ) nones
K (2 KEY ) keys
M
1
:M
2
onatenation of messages
fM g
K
enryption of message M by key K
For this spae of messages, we an dene the attaker's apabilities in terms of
the generation of new messages from those already possessed. We introdue a
`generates' relation `, whih relates a set of messages S to a message m that
an be generated from S . It is dened to be the least relation losed under the
inferene rules of Figure 2.1. We are now in a position to desribe the CSP model
of the Dolev-Yao style attaker. It is given as the proess ENEMY , dened as
follows:
ENEMY (S ) = trans?i?j ?m ! ENEMY (S [ fmg)
2
2i2USER
j2USER
mjS`m
re!i !j !m ! ENEMY (S )
The proess ENEMY (S ) desribes the possibilities available to an attaker in
possession of the set of messages S . The rst branh of the hoie models the
situation that a new message m an always be transmitted from any user to
any other user, and this will be interepted and added to the set of messages
possessed by the attaker. The seond branh of the hoie desribes that the
attaker an provide any message m that an be generated from S to any user
i , as if it ame from any other user j . In this ase the attaker's store of known
messages S does not hange.
The enemy will have some initial knowledge, inluding some nones he an
use, agents' identities, and ryptographi keys of agents that he ontrols. If the
initial knowledge is given as the set IK , then ENEMY | the environment that
the protool runs over | is given by
ENEMY = ENEMY (IK )
2.2 Speifying authentiation
When two parties engage in a protool run aimed at authentiating one to the
other, the intention is that ompletion of the run by the authentiating party
provides a guarantee that the other party had also partiipated in the run. Sine
speiations in CSP are dened in terms of events, we will introdue speial
signal events into the protool runs at the points we wish to mark: ompletion of a
protool run, and partiipation in a run. The approah of introduing mathing
signals to speify authentiation was introdued (not in the CSP ontext) by
Woo and Lam [WL93℄. These signals are introdued purely for the purposes
of speiation, to desribe stages that protool partiipants have reahed, and
they are used in the analysis and veriation of the protool. They are not events
that the attaker an engage in.
In our example, we will introdue only two signals. Generally, others ould
be introdued depending on the authentiation properties of interest.
Here we onsider the property of the initiator authentiating the responder.
This an be speied by introduing the following signals:
{ initdone:i :j :n, whih i performs after a protool run as initiator involving j ,
and using n as the none.
{ respgo:j :i :n, whih j performs during a protool run as responder apparently
initiated by i with none n.
The set of all possible signals for this protool and property is dened as follows:
SIGNAL = finitdone:i :j :n j i 2 USER ^ j 2 USER ^ n 2 NONCEg
[ frespgo:i :j :n j i 2 USER ^ j 2 USER ^ n 2 NONCEg
These signals will be inserted into the protool runs. The intention is that
an ourrene of the signal initdone:A:B :n
A
guarantees that (elsewhere in the
initdone:A:B :n
A
respgo:B :A:n
A
fB ; n
A
; n
B
g
K
AB
n
B
n
A
A B
Fig. 2. Introduing mathing signals
network, at B 's loation) the event respgo:B :A:n
A
has previously ourred, at
least one. Thus the respgo signal must be inserted before the responder trans-
mits his response to the rst message, sine it must be plaed ausally prior to
the initdone message. The plaing of the signals into the protool is illustrated
in Figure 2.
The inlusion of a spei none with the signal means that the agents must
agree on the partiular protool run: A does not only authentiate B 's presene,
but also that B was engaged in the same protool run.
The use of signals enables authentiation to be expressed as a trae speia-
tion: that any ourrene of initdone:A:B :n
A
in any trae of the overall network
must be preeded by some ourrene of respgo:B :A:n
A
. This an be dened
formally on traes, as:
respgo:B :A:n
A
preedes initdone:A:B :n
A
where
a preedes b b= tr  a = hi ) tr  b = hi
Observe that this speiation allows arbitrarily many b events in response to a
single a event. This has been termed non-injetive agreement [Low97℄.
The inlusion of dierent information in the signals an give rise to dierent
authentiation requirements. For example, the removal of the none from the
signals would allow interations in whih A's run ould orrespond to a dierent
run from B (i.e. one with a dierent none). However, there would still be a
guarantee that B has been involved in some run apparently with A. An even
weaker authentiation would simply allow the signal respgo:B , not even requiring
that B is engaged in a run apparently with A. This form of authentiation might
be appropriate if A simply requires some guarantee that B is alive. In pratie
dierent notions of authentiation are appropriate to dierent situations, and the
use of signals ontaining appropriate levels of detail allow these dierenes to be
expressed. The various avours of authentiation are disussed in [Sh98,Low97℄.
2.3 Protool partiipants
The protool partiipants are also desribed as CSP proesses. Here we will
onsider the modied version of the protool where the responder's identity is
inluded in the enryption of the seond message. There are two possible roles
in the protool, and eah of these will be desribed as a proess.
An initiator run is parameterised by the identity of the initiating agent, the
identity of the agent she wishes to authentiate, and the none used in the run.
Thus we dene INIT
i
(j ;n) as a run of agent i using none n to authentiate j :
INIT
i
(j ;n) = trans :i :j :n !
re:j :i?fj :n:yg
k
ij
!
trans :i :j :y !
initdone:i :j :n ! Stop
Observe the use of pattern mathing in the input of the seond message: n, j ,
and k
ij
are already xed, and the input message must math these. However,
any value for y an be aepted.
Similarly, RESP
j
(n
0
) is a responder run for agent j , using none n
0
for the
none that he generates. This is dened as follows:
RESP
j
(n
0
) = re:j ?i?x !
respgo:j :i :x !
trans :j :i :fj :x :n
0
g
k
ij
!
re:j :i :n
0
! Stop
Observe that RESP
j
(n
0
) is ready to run the protool with anyone who requests.
In the most general ase, an agent will be prepared to partiipate in any
number of onurrent protool runs in either role, whih is expressible as an
interleaving of runs. Our model must inorporate the fat that eah run uses a
dierent none, so we will use a olletion of pairwise disjoint sets of nones: N
I
j
will be an innite set of nones that j an use on initiator runs; and N
R
j
will
be an innite set of nones that j an use on responder runs. A general agent is
then given as:
USER
j
= (
jjj
n2N
I
j
2
i
INIT
j
(i ;n))
USER
A
USER
C
USER
B
trans:A
re:A
trans:B
re:B
initdone:A respgo:B
USER
E
ENEMY
Fig. 3. The Dolev-Yao model in CSP
jjj
(
jjj
n2N
R
j
RESP
j
(n))
The resulting system is given by
SYSTEM = (
jjj
i
USER
i
) j[ fj trans ; re jg ℄jENEMY
This arhiteture is pitured in Figure 3.
To show that the protool ensures that A authentiates B , we aim to establish
that the following speiation holds:
SYSTEM sat respgo:B :A:n
A
preedes initdone:A:B :n
A
3 A theorem for verifying authentiation
We will now introdue the rank funtion approah to verifying authentiation
protools. In this approah we onsider a restrition to the proess SYSTEM
whih prevents the ourrene of respgo:B :A:n
A
, and then aim to establish that
initdone:A:B :n
A
annot our. This approah is valid beause
SYSTEM sat respgo:B :A:n
A
preedes initdone:A:B :n
A
, SYSTEM j[ respgo:B :A:n
A
℄jStop sat tr  finitdone:A:B :n
A
g = hi
We will assoiate a value, or rank, with eah message that might our in
the restrited system, and aim to establish an invariant based on the message
values: that only those with positive ranks an irulate in the restrited system.
We aim to dene a rank funtion  : MESSAGE [SIGNAL! Zwith properties
that enable us to do this.
Our required result will follow if we an establish the following properties for
the rank funtion:
1. The attaker should not initially possess any messages of non-positive rank;
2. If the attaker only possesses messages of positive rank, then any messages
he an generate should also be of positive rank;
3. The signal initdone:A:B :n
A
has non-positive rank;
4. Any agent, when restrited on respgo:B :A:n
A
, does not introdue messages
or signals of non-positive rank if it has not previously reeived any suh
messages.
The rst two onditions between them ensure that the attaker annot intro-
due any non-positive rank messages; and the fourth ondition ensures that the
protool agents annot do this either. Together these onditions ensure that no
message or signal of non-positive rank an our in the restrited system. Sine
the third ondition requires that the signal we are onerned about should have
non-positive rank, we an onlude that this signal indeed annot our.
These onditions are formalised in the rank funtion theorem, whih is the
heart of the approah:
Theorem 1. If  : MESSAGE [ SIGNAL! Z is suh that:
1. 8m 2 IK :(m) > 0
2. 8S MESSAGE :((S ) > 0 ^ S ` m)) (m) > 0
3. (b) 6 0
4. 8 i :(USER
i
j[ a ℄jStop) sat (tr  re) > 0) (tr) > 0
then (
jjj
i
USER
i
) j[ trans ; re ℄jENEMY sat a preedes b.
Here we have abused notation, and extended  to apply not only to messages
and signals, but also to events, traes, and sets:
{ (:m) = (m)
{ (tr) = minf(s) j s in trg
{ (S ) = minf(s) j s 2 Sg
Thus, if we an nd a rank funtion  whih meets the four onditions above,
then we will have established that the system as desribed meets the orrespond-
ing authentiation property expressed as a preedes b.
3.1 Preserving rank
The rst three onditions of the rank funtion theorem an be heked indepen-
dently of any CSP protool desription. However, the fourth ondition requires
veriation of CSP proesses against a speiation. The benets of using the
Interleaving
8 i :(P
i
sat maintains )
jjj
i
P
i
sat maintains 
External hoie
8 i :(P
i
sat maintains )
2
i
P
i
sat maintains 
Prefixing
P sat maintains  (e) > 0
e ! P sat maintains 
Stop
Stop sat maintains 
Input
8 x :((f (x )) > 0) P(x ) sat maintains )
re:i?j ?f (x )! P(x ) sat maintains 
Fig. 4. Composition rules for maintains 
CSP traes model is that a number of appliation-spei rules an be identi-
ed, and applied in this partiular kind of veriation. We are interested in the
property maintains :
maintains  b= (tr  re) > 0) (tr) > 0
Figure 4 identies some ompositional rules whih are useful for establishing this
property.
The last rule in this gure requires some explanation. It onerns input of
a message whih mathes a partiular pattern f (x ), with subsequent behaviour
P(x ). If we an show that P(x ) sat maintains  whenever the input has positive
rank, then we an onlude that the inputting proess re:i :j ?f (x )! P(x ) also
maintains positive rank. We are not onerned with P(x ) for whih (f (x )) 6 0,
sine in suh ases the non-positive-rank message must have been introdued
externally to the proess, and so we do not need to onsider whether P(x )
maintains positive rank.
3.2 Verifying the modied protool
We aim to identify a rank funtion whih meets the four onditions of the rank
funtion theorem. In devising a rank funtion it is helpful to onsider the sorts of
messages that an legitimately pass on the network. Furthermore, the nature of
the generates relation `, and the CSP protool desriptions, impose onstraints
on any putative funtion .
For the fourth ondition, we are required to show, for an arbitrary user C ,
that:
USER
C
j[ respgo:B :A:n
A
℄jStop sat maintains 
We have that:
USER
C
j[ respgo:B :A:n
A
℄jStop
=
jjj
n
2
i
(INIT
C
(i ;n) j[ respgo:B :A:n
A
℄jStop)
jjj
jjj
n
(RESP
C
(n) j[ respgo:B :A:n
A
℄jStop)
In order to show that this ombination satises maintains , the inferene rules
for interleaving and hoie in Figure 4 mean that we have only to establish that
eah omponent separately maintains . In other words, for eah C , i , and n,
we have to establish:
INIT
C
(i ;n) j[ respgo:B :A:n
A
℄jStop sat maintains 
RESP
C
(n) j[ respgo:B :A:n
A
℄jStop sat maintains 
There are a number of ases to onsider:
Case INIT
C
;C = A; i = B ; n = n
A
In this ase we have
INIT
A
(B ;n
A
) j[ respgo:B :A:n
A
℄jStop =
trans :A:B :n
A
! re:A:B?fB :n
A
:yg
K
AB
! trans :A:B :y ! initdone:A:B :n
A
! Stop
We know from ondition 3 that initdone:A:B :n
A
must have non-positive rank,
sine this is the signal whose non-ourrene we wish to establish. If we are to
apply the rules for prexing to establish that this proess satises maintains ,
then we require that the message input in step 2 of the protool must have non-
positive rank. This follows beause the behaviour following a positive rank input
must itself satisfy maintains |and this is not possible beause initdone:A:B :n
A
(neessarily non-positive rank) is performed.
Thus we obtain a onstraint on the rank funtion we are searhing for to
establish orretness: that any message of the form fB :n
A
:yg
K
AB
must have
non-positive rank.
Case RESP
B
A seond ase whih is of interest is that of agent B as responder.
In this ase we have that
RESP
B
(y) j[ respgo:B :A:n
A
℄jStop =
re:B?i?x !
8
<
:
respgo:B :i :x ! trans :B :i :fB :x :yg
K
Bi
! re:B :i :y ! Stop if i 6= A or x 6= n
A
Stop if i = A and x = n
A
The partiular run with A and none n
A
is bloked, but all other runs are
allowed.
If the input message x has positive rank, and the rst branh of the ondition
is followed, then we have that either i 6= A, or x 6= n
A
. In this ase the trans-
mitted message fB :x :yg
K
Bi
should also have positive rank, sine this protool
run should not introdue non-positive-rank messages.
(i) = 1
(n) = 1
(k) =

0 if k = k
AB
1 otherwise
(m
1
:m
2
) = minf(m
1
):(m
2
)g
(fmg
k
) =

0 if m = B :n
A
:y and k = k
AB
(m) otherwise
(sig) =

0 if sig = initdone:A:B :n
A
1 otherwise
Fig. 5. A rank funtion for authentiation
A andidate rank funtion The onstraints arising from the two ases above
give rise to the rst attempt at a rank funtion. This is given in Figure 5. In this
rank funtion, we give a rank of 0 to those messages and signals identied above
as requiring non-positive rank, and also the shared key K
AB
, whih must remain
out of the hands of the attaker to prevent him from onstruting messages that
should not irulate. Other atomimessages (nones, agent identities, other keys)
an have rank 1. Other ompound messages essentially have the ranks ditated
by their omponents: if a message's ontent has rank 0, then any enryption or
onatenation of that message will likewise have a rank of 0.
It is straightforward to hek that ondition 2 holds for this rank funtion,
and it is entirely reasonable to state that in the model the attaker does not
start with any message of rank 0, as required by ondition 1.
Lastly, we are required to show that ondition 4 holds for all other ases.
However, sine these ases do not involve the important signals or protool mes-
sages their proofs are all straightforward:
{ RESP
A
: only generates messages fA:x :ng
K
Ai
, whih are of positive rank;
{ INIT
A
(i ;n), where i 6= B or n 6= n
A
. In this ase, the signal provided at the
end of the run will have rank 1, so no message or signal of non-positive rank
is produed;
{ INIT
B
(i ;n): only produes messages and signals of positive rank;
{ INIT
C
, RESP
C
(C 6= A;B): only produe messages and signals of positive
rank.
Thus the rank funtion is suÆient to establish that the orreted protool indeed
provides authentiation of B to A.
It is instrutive to see where this approah fails on the original awed pro-
tool. In that protool there is no agent name inluded in the seond message.
When onsidering the ase INIT
C
;C = A; i = B ;n = n
A
, we will obtain the
requirement that fn
A
:yg
K
AB
must have non-positive rank for any y , sine it is
the input of suh a message that leads to the performane of the non-positive-
rank signal initdone:A:B :n
A
1
. However, onsideration of the ase RESP
A
(n)
nds that messages of the form fx :ng
K
Ai
are output, and so these will need to
have positive rank, for any x and i
2
. But now there is a onit on the message
fn
A
:ng
K
AB
, whih from the rst ase must have non-positive rank, but from the
seond ase must have positive rank. Hene there an be no rank funtion for this
version of the protool: the onstraints on any rank funtion are ontraditory.
The ontradition is avoided by introduing the name of the agent generating
the message.
4 Disussion
4.1 Theorem-proving
In pratie, of ourse, protools tend to be more ompliated than our running
example, in a variety of ways. For example: the messages used in the protool
might be more omplex, or simply muh larger; there may be more messages
involved in the protool; the protool ould involve additional protool agents,
suh as trusted third parties, or even entire groups of ommuniating agents;
more omplex ombinations of ryptographi mehanisms might be used. All
of these possibilities make the CSP modelling of the protool a more diÆult
task, and the veriation of andidate rank funtions beomes more intriate and
error-prone. Tool support is of great benet in keeping trak of the housekeeping
involved in onsideration of numerous ases, and in assisting in the onstrution
of rank funtions.
The onstraints introdued by the rank funtion theorem an generally be
used to derive a andidate rank funtion. Firstly, every message in IK must have
positive rank. Seondly, any message derivable from a set of positive rank mes-
sages must also have positive rank. Thirdly, any output (message or signal) from
a protool step whih follows only positive rank inputs must also be of positive
rank. These three onditions allow the identiation of a set S of messages and
signals whih must have positive rank. However, the signal required in ondi-
tion 3 of the rank funtion theorem is required to have non-positive rank. If that
signal is in the set S then no rank funtion an exist. Otherwise the funtion
 whih gives a rank of 1 to all messages in S , and a rank of 0 to all other
messages, will be a suitable rank funtion.
The RankAnalyser tool [HS00,Hea00,HS04℄ provides a way of omputing this
rank funtion automatially for standard ases (where the protool uses publi-
key or shared-key ryptography, nones, agent names, and onatenation). The
(innite) message spae is partitioned to a nite set of equivalene lasses, and
the set of messages and signals of positive rank is obtained by repeatedly applying
protool steps and generates rules (on the equivalene lasses), starting from the
attaker's initial knowledge IK .
1
In the proof of the orret protool, the orresponding requirement was that
fB :n
A
:yg
K
AB
must have non-positive rank
2
Previously, it was required that fA:x :ng
K
AB
had positive rank
More generally, the PVS theorem prover [OSR93℄ has also been used to sup-
port rank funtion proofs of protool orretness. Theorem provers suh as PVS
are well-suited to keeping trak of all the unavoidable detailed housekeeping in-
volved in the nuts and bolts of a protool orretness proof. The traes model for
CSP has been embedded in PVS, together with muh of the onsequent theory,
inluding proof rules suh as those of Figure 4 and the rank funtion theorem has
been proved for this embedding [DS97℄. Spei protools an be modelled and
veried, for example the reursive authentiation protool analysed in [BS97℄,
demonstrating that this approah supports the full generality of an innite mes-
sage spae, and arbitrary numbers of runs and protool agents. More reently
the CSP hierarhy of theories within PVS has been restrutured [Eva03,ES04℄ to
more easily allow extensions within the rank funtion framework, suh as the in-
trodution of (disrete) time [ES00℄, as well as onsideration of other properties
suh as non-repudiation [Eva03℄.
The rank funtion approah has also been extended in other ways. It is able to
inorporate algebrai properties of the ryptographi mehanisms into the anal-
ysis, provided they an be expressed appropriately within the model [Sh02℄. For
example, if Vernam enryption (exlusive-or) is used expliitly within a protool,
then the algebrai properties of exlusive-or should be taken into aount in the
analysis. This an be ahieved by giving the algebrai identities that enapsulate
exlusive-or on the message spae, and heking that whenever two messages are
equivalent then they should have the same rank. This approah is learly limited
sine only known algebrai properties an be inluded in the model. Nonetheless
their inlusion allows the protool analyser to reason about the properties whih
a ryptosystem must satisfy if the protool is to be implemented orretly.
Another extension onerns the veriation of serey properties of protools,
partiularly in situations where keys an be leaked to an attaker without om-
promising the seurity of past protool runs. Suh keys are temporary serets:
omponents of messages that are required to be unknown to the attaker at a
partiular point of the protool, but an be dislosed later. The standard rank
funtion approah annot handle temporary serets, beause their rank should
be non-positive at the point they are used, but positive beause of the fat that
the attaker learns them during the protool run [DS04℄. Temporal rank fun-
tions are a generalisation that take into aount the time at whih a message an
rst be learned by the attaker, enabling a ner way of analysing the relation-
ships between messages. Use of temporal rank funtions requires a generalisation
of the rank funtion theorem, but they allow analysis of an additional lass of
serey properties not overed by the standard approah.
4.2 Model-heking
The use of CSP to desribe and speify protools naturally enables the use of
model-heking for veriation, and there has been a signiant body of work
using FDR [For03℄ in this area whih began a deade ago [Low95,Ros95,LR96℄.
The approah onstruts a CSP desription of the protool agents interating
over a Dolev-Yao style attaker as desribed earlier, and renement-heks it
against authentiation and serey properties expressed as CSP trae speia-
tions in terms of the signal events whih are inserted judiiously into the protool
runs. If the renement hek fails then FDR produes a (minimal-length) oun-
terexample trae whih orresponds to an attak on the protool: a sequene of
messages whih lead to a failure of the authentiation or serey property under
onsideration.
Sine the onstrution of the model of the protool is routine from the
message-passing protool desription, Lowe has developed a tool, Casper [Low98℄,
whih translates a high-level protool desription into the orresponding CSP
model, ready for FDR to analyse. The ease of use of this tool, together with
the speed of the FDR analysis, means that the model-heking analysis should
generally be the rst to be arried out when onsidering a new protool: simple
aws an be identied and orreted quikly, before too muh eort is put into
arrying out a rank funtion proof.
Of ourse, any CSP model whih an be ompletely heked by FDR must
have a nite number of states. This means that the number of protool runs in the
model, the number of agents, and the size of the message spae, must neessarily
be nite. Renement failures will always orrespond to attaks, but a suessful
renement hek on a nite model does not guarantee orretness in the presene
of arbitrary onurrent runs|it may be that an attak requires more possibilities
than have been inluded in the analysis. However, a olletion of sophistiated
tehniques have been developed for enabling more general onlusions to be
drawn from nite model-heking. For example, Lowe [Low99℄ has presented,
for serey speiations, a list of onditions under whih the orretness of
just a single run of a protool is suÆient to onlude the orretness of an
unbounded number of runs of the same protool. Hui and Lowe have shown
how protool messages in CSP models an be simplied without losing attaks
(fault-preserving transformations) [HL01℄, thus enabling omplex protools to be
redued to a point where they an be analysed by FDR. Broadfoot and Rosoe
have applied data independene tehniques [BR99,BR02℄ whih allow results
about a nite number of runs to be lifted to arbitrary runs.
An extensive overage of the use of CSP for modelling protools, and both
the model-heking and the rank funtion approahes to protool analysis, is
provided in [RSG
+
00℄.
4.3 Related approahes
In addition to the CSP approahes disussed above, a wide variety of formal
tehniques have been developed for protool speiation and analysis. These
inlude approahes based on graph theory, indution, multiset rewriting, type-
heking, and non-interferene. Here we give a avour of eah.
In the strand spae approah [THG99℄, a strand is a trae that represents
either the exeution of a legitimate protool partiipant (an `honest' strand) or
the ation of an attaker (a `penetrator' strand). A strand spae is a olletion
of strands equipped with a graph struture that represents both onseutive
operations on the same strand (the behaviour of a single user) and the interation
between strands (ommuniation between users). Theorems have been developed
on strand spaes whih enable proofs that a protool is orret, and tool support
for the approah has been provided by Athena [SBP01℄, a program that is part
model-heker and part theorem-prover. Some relationships have been identied
[Hea02℄ between the rank funtions used to verify protools, and the strutures
(ideals) used in the strand spaes approah, and there are some similarities in
the philosophies of the two approahes.
The indutive approah [Pau98℄ uses the theorem-prover Isabelle/HOL to
support a theorem-proving approah to protool veriation. Protools are oded
diretly in terms of event traes and rules that partiipants apply to `reeived'
messages in order to produe new messages. The possible ations of a `Spy' are
also speied by rules. A theory onerning the possible traes of the overall
system is developed and the protool is veried by establishing indutively that
no trae violating the speiation an ever our. A partiular ahievement of
this approah is its use in the veriation of SET [Pau02℄, an eletroni ommere
protool whose desription runs to nearly 1000 pages.
Cervesato et al. [CDL
+
99a℄ have developed a way of speifying protools us-
ing rst-order multiset rewriting. This has beome known as the MSR approah.
Using MSR, protools are speied by roles whih represent the behaviour of
protool partiipants. Eah role onstitutes a series of rewrite rules whih rep-
resent the ations of that partiular user. The attaker, typially in the style of
Dolev and Yao, is also dened via rewrite rules. Eah rewrite rule that an at-
taker an apply orresponds to a dedution of the form ` in the rank funtion
approah. Reent work has sought to establish a orrespondene between MSR
and the strand spae [CDM
+
00℄ and proess algebrai approahes [BCLM03℄.
Abadi and Gordon have proposed the spi-alulus [AG98℄ as an extension
to the -alulus whih inludes ryptographi primitives. Protools in the spi-
alulus are modelled as proesses | but the similarity with CSP ends here. The
fundamental dierenes between CSP and nominal aluli mean that, in the spi-
alulus, ommuniation of serets between parties is ahieved via restrition
and sope extrusion, and the nature of testing equivalene removes the need for
an expliit attaker proess. However, proving orretness via equivalene an
be diÆult. Abadi [Aba97℄ and, more reently, Gordon and Jerey [GJ01,GJ04℄
have therefore developed type-systems that enable authentiation properties |
expressed using signals | to be statially heked for a spi-alulus protool
model. The use of orrespondene assertions (in the spirit of the initdone and
respgo events) suggests a similarity between this approah and the rank funtion
approah, and it is also interesting to onsider that the `trusted' and `untrusted'
serey types may be interpreted as non-positive and positive ranks, respetively.
The onept of non-interferene has also formed the basis of protool analysis
tehniques. These approahes generally impose a partition on protool agents,
with a group of `high-level' privileged users distinguished from other `low-level'
users. Non-interferene is ahieved if the behaviour of a high-level user has no
eet on what a low-level user an observe. For the purposes of protool analysis
this orresponds to the inability of an attaker (a high-level user) to indue
bad behaviour in the legitimate partiipants (the low-level users). A suite of
tools have been developed that enable protools to be reasoned about using
non-interferene. A high-level protool desription an be translated into the
notation of the Seurity Proess Algebra (SPA) using the CVS ompiler [DFG00℄.
This SPA sript is then amenable for analysis using the CoSe tool [FG97℄ whih
heks for the presene of non-interferene. Similarities between non-interferene
and the onept of proess equivalene in CSP have been established [RS00℄.
The above tehniques, along with the CSP-based approahes, have muh
in ommon, most notably their basi assumption about the apabilities of the
attaker. Indeed, in many ases it will be feasible to reason about a protool using
any one of these methods, and the results obtained from eah will be broadly
similar. As alluded to above, there is a growing body of researh whih aims
to demonstrate fundamental similarities between these dierent approahes. In
the end the hoie of whih tehnique to use will be guided by the previous
experiene of the protool analyser. The advantage of applying CSP in this
domain lies in the simpliity of the notation and the transpareny with whih
protools an be modelled. This transpareny is essential for a model to be shown
as an appropriate abstration of a real protool. Furthermore, the maturity of
the language baks this up by allowing well-understood and powerful tehniques
to be brought to bear on the problem of verifying whether a given protool model
meets its intended goal.
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